

# Securing Location Aware Services Over VANET Using Geographical Secure Path Routing\*

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**Abstract—** We propose to secure location aware services over vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET) with our geographical secure path routing protocol (GSPR). GSPR is an infrastructure free geographic routing protocol, which is resilient to disruptions caused by malicious or faulty nodes. Geographic locations of anonymous nodes are authenticated in order to provide location authentication and location privacy simultaneously. Our protocol also authenticates the routing paths taken by individual messages. This paper presents the design of the GSPR secure geographic routing protocol. The overhead of location authentication is investigated under various scenarios through network simulation. Results show that although the presence of malicious nodes increases the routing path length, a data delivery rate of larger than 80% is sustained even if 40% of the nodes are malicious.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Advancements in the availability and capability of vehicular computers have led to the creation of vehicular ad-hoc networks, or VANETs. Creation of location aware services is an important abstraction for providing useful services. Location aware services permit vehicular computers and their operators to make location oriented queries. Location aware services can help in navigating traffic, selecting convenient routes, and querying various infrastructure services like service stations along the travel route [1]. Although prior research has addressed location aware services in a benign environment, these services require location authentication in order to be credible in a hostile environment. Examples of such environments would be personnel and equipment on battlefields, and vehicles on highways in mobile commerce scenarios. Securing location aware services by authenticating node locations in a VANET is the focus of this work.

Geographic routing is an established protocol for routing in ad-hoc networks [2], [3], [4]. It relies on nodes knowing their geographic locations, and using their one-hop neighbors for routing messages to target geographic destinations. Modern vehicles typically have an on-board GPS device. This makes geographic routing particularly suitable for routing in a VANET. Similar to other personal wireless devices, in VANET vehicles are typically used by a single person or family. Therefore, location privacy is usually a concern for people when using the services provided by VANET. VANETs are also vulnerable to malicious nodes and other

adversaries because there is no central coordinator, which makes it hard to impose admission control. The routing mechanism and the routed data both can be attacked. Securing location aware services in VANETs while simultaneously protecting location privacy is an interesting problem.

Securing ad-hoc routing is challenging because of the lack of pre-existing routing and security infrastructures. Nodes must create the routing infrastructure without using global knowledge. Lack of secure node identification is an additional challenge. Malicious or compromised nodes may pose as new nodes, or as known good nodes. Existing secure ad-hoc routing proposals have assumed various degrees of infrastructural support for addressing these challenges.

In this paper, we design an *infrastructure-free* secure geographic routing protocol. The significance of our approach, in comparison to existing location authentication work, is that it does not require out-of-band communication or shared secret initialization. Our solution is able to achieve ad-hoc security management by introducing inter-nodal periodic broadcast messages for monitoring node behavior. We also develop a novel method called *geographic hash* for encoding unforgeable geographic location data. Superior resource provisioning of vehicular nodes makes our solution reasonable and efficient for VANETs.

Our geographical secure path routing (GSPR) protects ad-hoc routing against malicious nodes and passive adversaries. The routing protocol operates on location aware anonymous nodes to provide privacy preserving secure geographic routing for ad-hoc networks. The protocol has the following goals:

- Route messages to desired geographic locations in the presence of malicious nodes. Detect and avoid bad geographic regions containing malicious or faulty nodes.
- Authenticate self-generated public keys and geographic locations of nodes on the routing path.

The overhead introduced by the protocol is investigated in various operational and attack scenarios using the NS2 network simulator [5]. Due to space limitations, the correctness and attack resistance of the protocol are addressed in an extended paper [6].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. An overview of geographic routing is presented in Section II. Section III discusses the geographic authentication model used for the proposed secure routing protocol. Section IV describes the

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


Fig. 1. An example of geographic location and integer co-ordinates. Co-ordinates are shown in curly brackets, e.g., {1110, 5556}. 11.118N, 55.563W is a geographic location.

GSPR protocol. The performance of GSPR in various operational and attack scenarios is investigated in Section V. Related work is discussed in Section VI, and Section VII presents the conclusions.

## II. PRELIMINARIES

Geographic routing is a well researched approach for ad-hoc routing [2], [3], [4], [7]. Nodes are expected to know their own geographic locations, and to share it with their one-hop neighbors through periodic beacons. The periodic beacons allow each node to know the geographic locations of its one-hop neighbors.

Messages carry their target locations as they are routed through the ad-hoc network. Under the assumption of bidirectional connectivity, geographic routing can be efficiently implemented on a planar sub-graph of the one-hop connectivity graph. A number of planarization approaches have been developed, and each can lead to a different subset of neighbors to use for routing. Once the choice of neighbors to use for routing is made, the next hop can be determined by greedily selecting the next hop to minimize the remaining distance to the target geographical location. Greedy forwarding fails if there is no next hop among the neighbors that is closer to the destination. In this case, geographic routing makes progress by entering the perimeter mode, in which the next-hop is selected to traverse the perimeter of the region where greedy forwarding fails. Perimeter mode forwarding continues as long as there is no better greedy next hop neighbor and the initial location where the perimeter mode started is not revisited again. Geographic routing is simple and efficient. The state required at each node depends only on the node density.

## III. MODEL

This section discusses the assumptions, the problems being solved, and the notation used in the paper. The participants in our geographical secure path routing protocol are referred to as nodes in the rest of this paper.

### A. Assumptions

All the nodes are assumed to know their *geographic locations*. The protocol operates on integer co-ordinates, which can be constructed by scaling the geographic co-ordinates with a global constant. For example, as shown in Figure 1, the integer co-ordinates {1111, 5556} of node A can be derived from the geographic location 11.118N, 55.563W by applying a scaling factor of 100. Nodes generate their own public-private key pairs. We also make standard assumptions about the non-invertibility of popular cryptographic functions.

Nodes are identified through *short-lived pseudonyms*. These pseudonyms are also used as physical level node identifiers in order to prevent physical level identification attacks. Pseudonyms are constructed from a pseudo-random number generator. This ensures that pseudonyms can not be used to derive real node identity. Nodes are assumed to silence transmissions while changing pseudonyms. Nodes can also estimate the number of one-hop neighbors either by listening to local transmissions or by knowing the node density. These capabilities are sufficient for using mix zones. Mix zones are regions with sufficient node density, which can provide large enough anonymity sets to support the desired level of anonymity [8]. Changing pseudonyms within mix zones prevents node tracking by making it impossible to associate a series of pseudonyms with a physical node. This protects the location privacy of participating nodes.

We assume that *promiscuous mode* reception is enabled on the networking adapters. Nodes overhear all transmissions in their one-hop neighborhood, which enables detection of malicious activity in the one-hop neighborhood. The underlying data link layer is expected to handle the hidden terminal problem, packet collision, and asymmetrical connectivity issues. Node connectivity is assumed to be symmetrical and resilient to packet losses caused by collisions or jamming.

*Node communication range* is assumed to be limited to one-hop neighborhood. The one-hop neighborhood is bounded by a maximum distance  $R$ . The maximum range distance is assumed to be a fixed global constant, which depends on the link layer technology being used. For example, in an outdoor IEEE 802.11 peer-to-peer wireless network, the maximum range is limited to a few hundred meters. Violations of connectivity radius are detected, and result in the offending node being eliminated from the secure routing protocol. Limited connectivity radius is a reasonable assumption in the context of standardized wireless networking hardware.

### B. Definitions

Consistent with traditional geographic routing [4], all the nodes are located on a plane. Every node  $p$  has a geographic location:  $\text{Location}(p) \equiv (\mathbf{p}_x, \mathbf{p}_y)$ . The integer co-ordinates  $p_x$  and  $p_y$  of the node are computed by scaling the geographic location with the global scaling factor. Each node  $p$  has a public key  $K_p$  such that a message  $m$  can be secretly sent to  $p$  by encrypting with the well known public key as  $K_p(m)$ . The corresponding private key  $K_p^{-1}$  is only known to  $p$ , and

$f \circ g(x)$	Function composition of $f$ and $g$ , i.e. $f(g(x))$ .
$K_p$	Public key of the node $p$ .
$K_p^{-1}$	Private key of the node $p$ .
$\{x\}_p$	A message consisting of string $x$ signed by node $p$ .
$(\mathbf{p}_x, \mathbf{p}_y)$	The geographic location of node $p$ , also represented as $\text{Location}(p)$ .
$(p_x, p_y)$	Integer co-ordinates of node $p$ derived by scaling its geographic location.
$\mathcal{N}(p)$	The set of nodes in the one-hop neighborhood of node $p$ .

TABLE I  
NOTATION

can not be computed from  $K_p$ . All the messages transmitted from  $p$  are digitally signed with the private key  $K_p^{-1}$ . The notation used in this paper is summarized in Table I.

We consider attacks from both malicious and faulty nodes. Malicious nodes may intentionally try to give incorrect responses, while faulty nodes may be attacked and have incorrect inputs to offer. Honest nodes are distinguished from malicious or faulty nodes as follows:

**DEFINITION 1 (Honest Node):** An honest node knows its correct geographical location, follows the maximum range constraint, and executes the GSPR routing protocol correctly. Otherwise, the node is called malicious or faulty.

The ad-hoc network consists of honest and malicious nodes. These nodes may be placed at arbitrary geographical locations. Nodes become candidates for geographic routing depending on their geographic location. Routing paths consist of sequences of nodes. Each node on the routing path is responsible for forwarding the message towards the geographic destination. Honest nodes in the one-hop neighborhood of forwarding nodes are called honest witnesses. The presence of honest witnesses allows the protocol to secure geographic routing while forwarding messages.

Geographic routing allows packets to be routed to destination locations. The routing protocol will return a failure message if there are no nodes in the one-hop neighborhood of the target location. If the one-hop neighborhood of the target location has one or more nodes, then each of them is considered a valid destination. Our GSPR protocol is able to identify malicious and faulty nodes and to choose only honest nodes to operate on. The routed packets are expected to reach target locations by using secure routing paths only.

**DEFINITION 2 (Secure Routing Path):** A secure routing path consists of a sequence of honest nodes, each of which is the one-hop neighbor of its predecessor.

Participation in our protocol allows nodes to find a secure routing path to the destination. The source node requests for a node located near the desired geographic location. GSPR finds an honest node in the one-hop neighborhood of the location if possible. The returned response contains

Category	Specific Threat
Routing attack	Dropping messages Routing in the wrong direction
Data attack	Payload modification Control data modification
Malicious node	Reporting false location Directional transmission Transmission power changes Tracking node location

TABLE II  
OVERVIEW OF THREATS HANDLED BY GSPR

the public key of the discovered node and the secure routing path to it. Message integrity is guaranteed for both query and response messages. Next-hop nodes for the query messages are determined by geographic routing, while the response message is source routed on the reverse path. The security properties of GSPR protocol are listed below:

**DEFINITION 3 ( Properties of GSPR protocol ):** Given a message  $\mathfrak{M}$  starting at node  $s$  with the destination geographic location  $D$ , a geographic secure path routing (GSPR) protocol is secure if the following properties hold:

- If there is a secure routing path  $S(s, d)$  from the source node  $s$  to a node  $d$  located within one-hop distance of the destination location  $\mathcal{D}$ , then  $\mathfrak{M}$  is routed to  $d$ .
- The destination node  $d$  receives the secure routing path  $S(s, d)$ .
- On receiving the returned response, the source node  $s$  gets the correct public key  $K_d$  of the destination, and the secure routing path  $S(s, d)$  traversed by the message.

### C. Threat model

A summary of threats is given in Table II. Attacks can be mounted on the routing mechanism by dropping or incorrectly forwarding messages. Incorrect forwarding means forwarding messages towards incorrect directions, and includes classical attacks like routing loops and wormholes. Attacks on routed data could target the payload or the control data required for protocol operation. Control data susceptible to modification includes node identifiers, node locations, and other data fields governing the routing protocol.

Nodes are also vulnerable to attack in an ad-hoc networking environment. Compromised nodes can be controlled by an attacker, causing them to behave maliciously or incorrectly, as defined in Definition 1. Malicious nodes may also collude to continuously track the location of a node, thereby violating its location privacy. In the case of nodes having home locations, location privacy violations also make anonymity violations more likely.

A number of low level attacks are possible against wireless ad-hoc networks. The jamming attack blocks radio transmissions in a given geographic region, thereby preventing the routing protocol from using that area. Jamming can be tackled with spread spectrum techniques [9]. Other low level




Fig. 2. Using one-way functions to create geographic hashes.  $H_x$  and  $H_y$  are one-way functions that are applied to maintain geographic hash values at different geographical locations.  $r_s$  is a random nonce published by node  $S$ , and is used to compute the geographic hash of node  $S$ .

attacks include transmission power changes and directional transmissions. These attacks are detected by the protocol and the responsible nodes classified as malicious.

#### IV. GEOGRAPHICAL SECURE PATH ROUTING

The details of our geographical secure path routing protocol are described in this section. Each of the building blocks: geographic hashes, periodic beacons, geographic routing, and malicious node detection are presented below.

##### A. Geographic hashes

We develop a novel method, called geographic hashes, for encoding relative geographic positions of two nodes. Our solution associates unforgeable transient geographic hashes to relative geographic positions, as shown in Figure 2. A node maintains a set of integer tokens called geographic hashes, each of which associates a secret with a geographic location. The secret cannot be obtained by the node *without* being in the vicinity of the corresponding location. On the other hand, the knowledge of knowing the secret can be verified remotely by anyone, which is due to the one-wayness property.

Geographic hashes are created through modular arithmetic. Consider a large prime  $p$  and a generating number  $a$ , such that the function  $f(x) \equiv a^x \pmod p$  maps  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$  onto itself. Each integer  $h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  can be used to represent a one-way function  $H(x) \equiv (a^h)^x \pmod p$  since the discrete logarithm problem of finding  $x$ , given  $y = a^x \pmod p$ , is believed to be NP-hard. Geographic hash is formally defined as follows:

**DEFINITION 4 (Geographic Hash):** Each node  $A$  periodically publishes the following geographic hash parameters: a large prime  $p$ , a generator  $a$  for  $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$ , three integers  $\zeta_A, \eta_A, \theta_A \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , and a time interval  $\Delta_A$  indicating the expiry time for a single version of the geographic hash.

The geographic hash of  $A$  is initialized to  $(r_A, r_A)$  at  $A$ , where  $r_A$  is a random nonce selected by  $A$ . Successive versions  $r_A[i]$  and  $r_A[i+1]$  of the random nonce satisfy:

$$r_A[i+1]a^{\theta_A} \pmod p = r_A[i]$$

Each node  $B$  in the neighborhood of  $A$  computes the geographic hash of  $A$  at  $B$  as follows:

$$\text{GH}(A, B) = \left( r_A a^{\zeta_A \Delta x} \pmod p, r_A a^{\eta_A \Delta y} \pmod p \right)$$

where  $\Delta x$  and  $\Delta y$  are the differences in the integer coordinates related to the geographic location of  $A$  and  $B$ . The node  $B$  expires the geographic hash after time interval  $\Delta_A$ .

In our protocol,  $B$  learns  $A$ 's location from  $A$ 's periodic beacon messages, which will be described in the next section. The geographic hash is a tuple of integers computed by repeated applications of one-way functions to the locally known geographic hash of a node. Since the construction of geographic hashes encodes the relative geographic locations of nodes, the computed geographic hash values would be identical across different calculation paths. Note that if a node  $B$  lies about  $\Delta_x$  and  $\Delta_y$ , the calculated geographic hash values would disagree as long as there is an independent calculation path having honest nodes. This would result in malicious node detection as discussed in Section IV-D.1.

##### B. Beacon

Nodes are required to know one-hop neighbor locations for geographic routing. This is achieved by having the nodes transmit a periodic beacon containing the node identifier and location. Nodes continuously listen for beacons from neighboring nodes. The information gathered from the received beacons is stored in memory in order to support geographic routing. Our protocol extends the beacon to include the public key and the random nonce selected by the node. This ensures that public keys of nodes are well known in the one-hop neighborhood. The beacon also includes locations and geographic hashes of neighboring nodes. Beacon messages are digitally signed with the private key of the node and are broadcast to all the one-hop neighbors.

**DEFINITION 5 (Periodic Beacon):** Each node  $p$  periodically broadcasts a beacon message containing its geographic location, random nonce  $r_p$ , public key  $K_p$ , neighbor information list  $\mathbb{Q}$ , and a set of geographic hashes  $\mathbb{G}$  known to it. The beacon message is broadcast to all nodes in the one-hop neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}(p)$  of  $p$  as shown below:

$$p \rightarrow \mathcal{N}(p) \quad \left\{ \{p, \text{Location}(p)\}_p, r_p, K_p, \mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{M} \right\}_p$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{where } \mathbb{Q} &\equiv \left\{ \{q, \text{Location}(q)\}_q \mid q \in \mathcal{N}(p) \right\} \\ \text{and } \mathbb{G} &\equiv \left\{ \{q, \text{GH}(q, p)\} \mid \text{Distance}(q, p) < 2R \right\} \\ \text{and } \mathbb{M} &\equiv \left\{ \langle q, \text{Evidence} \rangle \mid q \text{ is malicious} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

The periodic beacon permits sharing the information used for validating routing actions. Sharing the neighbor information list  $\mathbb{Q}$  helps in detecting false location attacks among the set of one-hop neighbors. The geographic hashes of nodes located within twice the maximum one-hop radius  $R$  are stored in memory. These geographic hashes are shared with neighboring nodes in order to detect malicious routing behavior beyond the one-hop neighbors.




Fig. 3. Geographical Secure Path Routing Protocol

### C. Routing protocol

The GSPR protocol has a two step query-response messaging model. Payload and control data are sent towards the destination location, as is done in traditional geographic routing protocols. The returning source routed acknowledgment completes the protocol. Figure 3 exhibits a concise description of the protocol. Protocol messages are digitally signed with the private key of the sending node. Forwarding nodes verify digital signatures in order to detect malicious behavior. The geographic forwarding step of the protocol not only forwards the payload to a next-hop selected according to geographic routing, but also sends back a local response containing the geographic hash of the next-hop node. Since geographic hashes are unforgeable, the local response helps in identifying malicious nodes and selecting alternative routes in case of attack. The geographic forwarding step builds up the routing path which is used for routing the reverse response back to the source. On receiving the reverse response, the protocol completes by authenticating the public key of the destination node. Due to page limit, we refer readers to the full version of our paper for details of the GSPR protocol [6].

### D. Malicious node detection

Malicious node detection is based on the broadcast nature of wireless communication and is modeled after the watchdog protocol [10]. Nodes listen to the transmissions of their neighbors in order to detect malicious nodes. Malicious nodes are not used for routing. Honest nodes witnessing malicious activity will warn neighboring nodes through the periodic beacon. Watchdog protocols are vulnerable to blacklisting attacks. Because the GSPR protocol uses temporary pseudonyms, a blacklisting attack can only have

a temporary effect. Avoiding temporary blacklisting is not a goal of the protocol, and is not considered further. Malicious nodes are detected both by checking for inconsistencies in the periodic beacons and by checking the correctness of geographically routed messages and their reverse source routed responses.

1) *Beacon validation*: Periodic beacons are received from neighboring nodes. Beacons are stored in memory and their contents used for detecting malicious nodes. Nodes launching false location attacks are detected by applying the range constraint  $R$ . All nodes report on the location and geographic hash of two-hop neighbors. Each node constructs a number of mappings from pseudonym to location, one received from each neighbor. Small inconsistencies in location are ignored as location errors. Larger inconsistencies permit the node to conclude that its one-hop neighborhood has malicious nodes and is a bad neighborhood. Nodes located in bad neighborhoods do not forward messages, but continue to transmit the beacon in order to propagate geographic hashes and malicious node information.

2) *Forwarding validation*: Operating in promiscuous mode permits overhearing wireless transmissions of one-hop neighbors. Incorrect forwarding is detected and the incorrectly forwarding nodes classified as malicious. Message forwarding operations of GSPR can be abstracted to a simple multi-hop ad-hoc forwarding protocol as follows: Let  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$  be successive hops on a routing path. All the transmissions made by  $B$  must be received by  $A$  because of the one-hop neighbor relationship. Therefore,  $A$  can detect if  $B$  fails to forward a message by listening for the next-hop transmission. In this case, the honest previous hop node  $A$  can identify the malicious node  $B$  without the need for other honest witness nodes. Similarly,  $A$  can check the overheard

next-hop transmission (from  $B$  to  $C$ ) for malicious payload modification or control data modification. Data tampering by  $B$  is detectable as the message from  $B$  to  $C$  is digitally signed with the private key of  $B$ , which can be verified by  $A$  because of being in the one-hop neighborhood. In the case that both  $B$  and  $C$  are malicious,  $B$  can forward the message correctly to  $C$ , and later collude by not reporting a malicious forwarding by  $C$ . This collusion case is detected by the honest witness node  $G$ , which is the one-hop neighbor of  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ . Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to [6] for proof that such honest witnesses will exist given sufficient node density, and that the presence of the honest witness will permit  $A$  to recognize that  $B$  and  $C$  are malicious.

On encountering malicious nodes, the previous hop node  $A$  will find another route to the destination or send back a routing failure to the source. Nodes also check the integrity of messages and feasibility of routing paths by validating the geographic location list  $\mathbb{L}$  for maximum transmission limit  $R$ . Messages violating the range constraint are dropped, and the previous hop node classified as malicious. The security of our protocol is shown in the extended version of this paper [6].

**THEOREM 1:** Let  $R$  be the node connectivity radius. If the honest node density is greater than  $\frac{18}{R^2}$ , then the geographical secure path routing protocol provides the following security properties:

- Messages are routed through secure routing paths.
- The destination node receives the secure routing path.
- The source node receives the secure routing path and the correct public key of the destination node.

The basic idea behind the security of our protocol is that given high enough honest node density, every malicious forwarding will be detected. Using beacons for spreading information within the two-hop neighborhood permits detection of malicious nodes and bad neighborhoods beyond the one-hop direct observation range. False location claims are handled by unforgeable geographic hashes. Detection of malicious forwarding and geographic hashes work together to provide security to our protocol.

## V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Performance of geographic secure path routing is analyzed by the NS2 network simulator [5]. Although NS2 has support for wireless and mobile ad-hoc network simulation, geographic routing is not available in the standard NS2 code. Therefore, we use the patch provided by Kiess [11], [12] that maintains Karp's original implementation of GPSR [4]. The patch simulates IEEE 802.11 MAC layer with a node range of 500m. It provides support for mobility through the random way point model [13].

Geographic routing makes all routing decisions based on the local one-hop neighborhood. Since secure routing detects and avoids malicious nodes, the changes to routing performance can be evaluated by changing the routing behavior to avoid malicious nodes. The remaining protocol operations just authenticate node locations and public keys without affecting routing. Therefore, we change only the local routing behavior of geographic routing in order to

assess the performance of GPSR. We modified the simulator code to keep track of malicious or honest nodes. The routing mechanism was also modified to operate in the base mode or to avoid malicious nodes for routing.

The objective of this evaluation is to compare the routing performance and attack resilience of traditional insecure GPSR protocol against our proposed geographical secure path routing protocol. We select percentage rate of data delivery and routing path length as indicators of routing performance. The comparative evaluation of the two routing protocols is done for various combinations of node density, mobility, and the presence of malicious nodes.

### A. Node density

GPSR and secure routing were simulated on NS2 using one constant bit rate source per node. Simulation is done with stationary nodes randomly placed on a square area with side 800m. The number of nodes was varied from 20 to 50 to create a number of node density scenarios. The simulation was run for 300 seconds of simulated time. An average of 10 runs was used in the following observations. The delivery rate was calculated by counting the number of application packets sent and received. Path length was computed by tracing GPSR packets through forwardings. As shown in Figure 4, the baseline GPSR protocol attains a high percentage of packet delivery. This is consistent with Karp's observations in [4]. It can be observed that introducing 20% malicious nodes severely impacts the effectiveness of GPSR as demonstrated by the reduction in delivery rate. Geographic secure path routing is resilient to the malicious nodes. Its delivery rate closely replicates the rate achieved by GPSR in a benign environment.

The impact of incorrect routing introduced by malicious nodes is shown in Figure 5. Given the node range of 500m, and the  $0.64\text{km}^2$  node placement area, we expect nodes to be about 2 hops away in the greedy routing case. This is consistent with our average reading of 3.38 hops for GPSR in a benign environment. We also note that secure routing incurs an overhead on the routing path length by routing packets around malicious nodes. The average number of hops for geographic secure path routing with 20% malicious nodes is 10.37, an increase of about three times over GPSR in a benign environment.

### B. Effect of malicious nodes

Malicious nodes publish an incorrect location on their beacons. We modify the published location of the malicious node to appear as the closest neighbor for the packet being forwarded. This allows malicious nodes to falsely become the next hop neighbors. Malicious nodes also forward the packet to a random neighbor in violation of geographic routing rules. The effect of malicious nodes on GPSR and geographic secure path routing is studied by running an NS2 simulation with varying proportions of malicious nodes in a universe of 42 stationary nodes. These nodes are placed randomly in a rectangular area of  $1.5\text{km}$  by  $0.5\text{km}$ . Observations are




Fig. 4. Data delivery rate achieved with stationary nodes with baseline GPSR and with secure routing.




Fig. 5. Routing path length in the stationary node scenario with baseline GPSR and with secure routing.




Fig. 6. Effect of malicious nodes on data delivery.




Fig. 7. Effect of malicious nodes on path length.




Fig. 8. Effect of mobility on data delivery rate for baseline case and with 10% malicious nodes.




Fig. 9. Effect of mobility on routing path length for baseline case and with 10% malicious nodes.

collected by averaging over 10 runs of 300 seconds of simulated time.

The data delivery achieved in the presence of malicious nodes is shown in Figure 6. It can be observed that insecure geographic routing is very sensitive to malicious nodes. The delivery rate falls rapidly even with a small percentage of malicious nodes. The simulation also indicates that malicious nodes do not affect the delivery rate of our secure routing. The secure delivery rate falls from close to 100% in a benign environment to about 90% when 40% of the nodes are malicious. The effect on forwarding path length is shown in Figure 7. The path length shown by insecure geographic routing grows by orders of magnitude as the malicious nodes force the insecure protocol to route in incorrect directions.

Geographic secure path routing incurs a more modest overhead by rejecting malicious nodes for routing.

### C. Effects of mobility

The effect of mobility on data delivery rate is given in Figure 8. Mobility improves the data delivery rate of secure routing because mobility allows nodes to discover new honest nodes. This effect is also found in the insecure geographic routing to a smaller degree. Geographic routing in insecure environment becomes less effective with increasing mobility because of increasing chance of inaccuracy in one-hop node locations. We also note that mobility reduces the path length of secure routing, as shown in Figure 9. This happens because mobility increases the chance of discover-

ing new honest nodes in the one-hop neighborhood.

## VI. RELATED WORK

Secure routing in ad-hoc networks has been investigated by a number of prior works. Hu and Perrig propose the Ariadne protocol for securing on-demand and source routing protocols in ad-hoc networks [14]. Similarly, the SEAD protocol [15] secures distance vector routing in ad-hoc networks. Both the protocols requires a secure cryptographic initialization phase, but use highly efficient symmetric key cryptography. While our approach uses expensive modular arithmetic, it does not require secure initialization.

The privacy threat posed by location aware devices has also been a topic of intense research. Existing research has taken two approaches for protecting user privacy: the first is to fudge the locations of identifiable nodes as in [16], [17]. The second is to use pseudonyms for temporary identification of nodes as proposed in [8], [18], [19], [20], [21]. We use the latter approach because secure geographic routing requires authenticated locations. Using temporary pseudonyms for location aware nodes allows us to provide location privacy and location authentication simultaneously.

A multi-hop anonymous challenge mechanism has been used by Mahajan et. al. [22] for detection of free riders in ad-hoc wireless network. Their mechanism requires two-hop transmission of challenge messages. Our recursive challenge response is related to their mechanism in the sense that remote nodes are used for security processing. Unlike in our work, the authors do not study the effects of mobility.

A scheme based on secure cryptographic initialization is presented by Liu et. al. [23] to provide robust location estimation for sensor nodes in a hostile environment. Our approach is distinguished in the sense that we do not require any secure initialization. However, our approach is more expensive, requiring asymmetric cryptography. As noted in Section VII, this disadvantage is not significant in a VANET.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

We design and evaluate geographical secure path routing, a privacy preserving ad-hoc routing protocol, which geographically routes messages through anonymous nodes to destination locations. The secure routing protocol also authenticates the public key and the geographic location of destination nodes.

Geographical secure path routing protocol requires associative cryptographic one-way hash functions for security. These hash functions are derived from the discrete logarithm problem which uses expensive modular arithmetic. Superior resource provisioning of vehicular networks makes our solution suitable for securing location aware services on VANET.

Geographical secure path routing protocol was evaluated with the NS2 network simulator for various values of node density, node mobility, and the proportion of malicious nodes. Evaluation results show that the protocol tolerates malicious nodes with an increased routing path length. The geographical secure path routing protocol is also able to maintain a low loss rate even when the majority of nodes are malicious.

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